Fundraising September 15, 2024 – October 1, 2024 About fundraising

Austin on Locutionary and Illocutionary Acts (The...

Austin on Locutionary and Illocutionary Acts (The Philosophical Review, Vol. 77, No. 4. Oct., 1968)

John Searle
How much do you like this book?
What’s the quality of the file?
Download the book for quality assessment
What’s the quality of the downloaded files?
IN ATTEMPTING to explore Austin's notion of an illocutionary act I have found his corresponding notion of a locutionary
act very unhelpful and have been forced to adopt a quite different distinction between illocutionary acts and propositional acts.
I think this difference is more than a matter of taxonomical preference and involves important philosophical issues-issues such as the nature of statements, the way truth and falsehood relate to statements, and the way what sentences mean relates to what speakers mean when they utter sentences. In this paper I want to explain my reasons for rejecting Austin's distinction and for introducing certain other distinctions, and in so doing to show how these questions bear on some of the larger philosophical issues
Volume:
77-4
Year:
1968
Edition:
1
Publisher:
The Philosophical Review
Language:
english
Pages:
21
File:
PDF, 392 KB
IPFS:
CID , CID Blake2b
english, 1968
Read Online
Conversion to is in progress
Conversion to is failed

Most frequently terms